Commit Graph

9 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
436f7417be feat: adopt bchen-sqlite-migrate package; replace inline SCHEMA_DDL
Phase 3 of the cross-project sqlite-migrate adoption — port nanodrop to
consume bchen-sqlite-migrate@v0.1.0. Replaces the inline db.exec(...)
block in src/db/schema.ts with applyMigrations(db, MIGRATIONS_DIR,
{ genesisProbeTable: 'users' }).

The genesis-probe (table 'users' exists) handles pre-existing prod DBs
automatically — first deploy after merge stamps 0001_init as applied
without re-executing, subsequent boots are no-ops.

Adds three npm scripts (db:migrate, db:status, db:stamp) and a
byte-stability test pinning sha256(0001_init.sql) so the migration is
treated as immutable history.
2026-05-12 08:02:36 -07:00
cbc22dcac4 refactor: drop redundant iat intersections and reuse JwtPayload in tests
JwtPayload already declares iat?: number, so the & { iat?: number } in
makeRequireAuth and slideSessionIfNeeded was a no-op. The unit test had a
local TestPayload duplicating the same shape — replaced with the canonical
import.
2026-05-09 10:23:24 -07:00
a4355e1ef3 refactor(auth): drop JWT_EXPIRY env var (family TTL is canonical)
The JWT lifetime is now pinned to SESSION_TTL_SECONDS (30 days)
inside issueSessionCookie, so JWT_EXPIRY had no effect after the
prior commits. Removing the field from Config and the env read in
loadConfig lets the TypeScript compiler verify no caller was still
relying on it.

Per the family invariant ('coherence across apps is a feature'),
the per-app override is intentionally gone — a deploy with stale
JWT_EXPIRY in .env will now silently use the 30-day family default
regardless of the value.

Test fixtures (Config literals in setup.ts, login-handler.test.ts,
lockout-service.test.ts) and config.test.ts assertions updated to
match the new shape.
2026-05-09 10:17:04 -07:00
0f0c2f0e96 feat(auth): sliding session renewal middleware
Adds src/middleware/session-renewal.ts with slideSessionIfNeeded —
a pure function that re-mints the session cookie iff the JWT is
older than SESSION_RENEW_THRESHOLD_SECONDS (1 hour). Wired into
makeRequireAuth so every authenticated request bumps the cookie's
expiration window forward, giving the 'stay signed in unless you
clear cookies' UX.

Logout paths are explicitly guarded via LOGOUT_PATHS so the
renewer never resurrects a session the user is actively
terminating. Query-string strip prevents /logout?next=foo bypass.
Opportunistic-auth blocks (GET /, GET /f/:id) verify JWT directly
without going through makeRequireAuth, so they don't slide — by
design, a public file view shouldn't extend the owner's session.

Tests cover threshold semantics, both logout paths, query-string
handling, missing iat (legacy token forces refresh), and a full
integration suite simulating 25-day and 31-day jumps via
vi.setSystemTime.
2026-05-09 10:15:31 -07:00
ad36b23061 feat(auth): add shared login handler with constant-time clamp
All checks were successful
Deploy to Homelab / deploy (push) Successful in 18s
Single attemptLogin() orchestrates lockout check, bcrypt verify (against
real or dummy hash), success/failure logging, and a configurable minimum
response-time clamp. Both login routes will share this — no duplication.

Adds three logger events for the operator's escalation pipeline:
AUTH_LOCKOUT_TRIGGERED, AUTH_LOCKED_ATTEMPT, and AUTH_RATE_LIMITED.
fail2ban filters can pick these up to escalate persistent attackers from
in-app lockout to IP ban.

Constant-time defense: unknown users still pay bcrypt cost (via dummy hash)
and the clamp ensures locked-vs-unknown-vs-wrong-password aren't
distinguishable by response time. Username is canonicalized (lowercase + trim)
before lookup so attackers can't bypass lockout via case variation.
2026-05-03 03:34:15 -07:00
11e87f353d feat(auth): add login-attempts DB layer and lockout service
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Deploy to Homelab / deploy (push) Successful in 18s
Persists per-username failed-attempt counts and computed locked_until
timestamps. Lockout service computes exponential-backoff durations
(min(base * 2^(count-threshold), max)) with auto-unlock once locked_until
passes. Successful login deletes the row, resetting the counter.

Pure DB-keyed lockout — survives server restarts and shares state across
both login routes (HTML and JSON) when wired in a later step.
2026-05-03 03:29:09 -07:00
f4eaf88495 feat(auth): add login_attempts schema, lockout config, dummy-hash helper
All checks were successful
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Lays the foundation for brute-force defense: per-username attempt tracking
table, configurable lockout/rate-limit thresholds, and a memoized dummy
bcrypt hash so unknown-user paths can be timed identically to wrong-password
paths in a later step.

Adds @fastify/rate-limit dependency for upcoming per-IP rate-limit on
login routes.
2026-05-03 03:26:46 -07:00
157d1e8230 Add auth service, storage service, types, and logging middleware
- Auth service: hashPassword/verifyPassword via bcrypt
- Storage service: saveFile, getFilePath, deleteStoredFile with ENOENT handling
- Types: JwtPayload interface
- Logging middleware: createLogger writing AUTH_FAILURE, AUTH_SUCCESS, FILE_NOT_FOUND
- 27 tests passing

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-03 15:49:22 -08:00
b6aa6211a9 Scaffold project and implement config, DB schema/queries
- Set up package.json (ESM, scripts), tsconfig.json, vitest.config.ts
- Install runtime and dev dependencies
- Add CLAUDE.md with architecture notes and code quality rules
- Config module with env var parsing and JWT_SECRET validation
- DB schema: users + files tables with FK cascade
- DB queries: createUser, getUserBy*, createFile, getFileById, getFilesByUserId, deleteFile
- Tests for config, db/users, db/files (15 tests passing)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-03 15:48:21 -08:00